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1.4(C), 1.4(D)

Issue 1: Operation Support Hope

- o The military's drawdown from the region has proceeded more quickly than had been expected. We must ensure that the departure is not precipitous and that the handover to relief agencies goes smoothly.
- o We had understood that our military presence would slowly be phased out, with DoD targeting September 30 as the end date for the mission.
- o Despite assurances by DoD that a withdrawal from Kigali was not imminent, we learned over the weekend that there are now only three U.S. military personnel based in Kigali (down from a high of over 200). Total U.S. military presence in the region is now 828 troops: 674 in Entebbe; 3 in Kigali; 131 in Mombasa; and 20 in Nairobi. An air ~~unit~~ logistical support team commutes from Entebbe into Kigali during the day when needed.
- o By the time of the Ad Hoc meeting, DoD is supposed to supply a timeline for their withdrawal, a list of equipment they would leave behind, and contracts they have entered into to take over services they are now performing. We will share this information with UNHCR so that a smooth transition can be worked out.
- o At the same time, Geneva is working to have UNHCR identify needs that must be met prior to the military's withdrawal.
- o The Ad Hoc group should review the status of the hand off process and DoD's timetable and plan for withdrawal. We also need to begin thinking about the level of U.S. involvement in the relief effort after the planned September 30 withdrawal.

Issue 2: Security in the Camps/Ex-Rwandan Army in Zaire

- o The Zairian Government has clarified that the assistance they seek in moving the ex-Rwandan army away from the border is essentially financial. In addition to the U.S., the GOZ has approached the French and the UN for assistance. The UN has not responded (although the SYG has dispatched two envoys to the region to assess and report), and the French response, if one has been made, is not yet known.
- o GOZ officials saw little willingness on the part of the refugees to cooperate with the planned move. The GOZ did not provide any additional details on how the move would be accomplished.

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- o The UN sees three options for handling the security question: assisting the Zaire government, expanding UNAMIR, and hiring a private security force. UN officials do not like any of the three: (1) the Zairians have not shown much potential for improvement (indeed, they have been part of the problem); (2) the UN has not yet completed deployment in Rwanda, and expanding UNAMIR would require finding more troops, which the UN thought would be difficult; and (3) the UN considers the mercenary idea unrealistic. (The GOZ was unenthusiastic about this last option, as well.)
- o The French and Belgians were also demarched to obtain their thoughts on how to address the security problem; we have not yet received the Belgian response. The French await the recommendations of the SYG's envoys to the region before committing to a specific course of action. In general, the French are skeptical of moving the ex-FAR as a cohesive force, and prefer progressive demobilization of the troops, followed by integration of these persons into the main body of refugees in the camps around Goma.
- o Despite concerns about the Zaire option, the UN is planning to go ahead with security training assistance for Zairois forces. UN special envoy for Rwanda Shahryar Khan is expected to discuss the security issue with the GOZ in the near future.
- o The OAU and UNHCR are holding a refugee conference September 7-9 in Addis Ababa. We have persuaded the participants to hold special sessions on the margins to discuss Rwanda/Burundi, with the focus on refugee repatriation and security issues. Regional leaders will attend, as will representatives of the EU and PRM DAS Oakley, AF DAS Bushnell, and Amb. Rawson from Kigali. This will be a good opportunity to force a serious consideration of the security question by the major regional players.
- o DoD is working on a paper examining the actual force requirements that would be needed to provide security in the camps.

## Issue 3: UNAMIR

- o The Tunisians are ready to deploy, but the UN has asked them to wait one to two weeks until the UN has the logistical capability to support the additional troops. The U.S. is airlifting the contingent's equipment (primarily German APC's), but OSD is waiting for a legal opinion on the sufficiency of the paperwork submitted by the UN. If the UN's letter suffices, movement of the equipment could be completed in one week to 10 days.

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- o The main body of the Zambian battalion began arriving on September 6. We are waiting for paperwork from the UN to lift vehicles for the Ghanaian battalion and other UNAMIR supplies. OSD has been pressing the UN at the working level to speed up its paperwork, and State will call Kofi Annan to reiterate the need to move quickly on this.
- o The French have indicated they are willing to be flexible on extending logistical support for the francophone contingents in UNAMIR II. They have entered into discussions with the UN, and may be prepared to remain in the region beyond September 15.

### Issue 4: Radios



1.4(C), 1.4(D)

- o Positive Messages: A USG team is going to New York tomorrow to discuss in detail the UN's request for a radio, with the aim of providing whatever assistance we can. (The UK has also expressed willingness to help the UN in this area.) It is unlikely that the equipment the UN needs is in DoD inventory, but, to speed up UN procurement, we might lease it from a known supplier and re-lease it to the UN. The UN has also asked for 25 engineers, which could be difficult for the U.S. to provide.

### Issue 5: Burundi

- o According to our Embassy in Bujumbura, the presidential succession talks appear to be nearing a conclusion. The ruling FRODEBU party has apparently agreed to a 55/45 powersharing split with the opposition (down from 60/40). Extremists in both groups still need to be sold on the deal.
- o We have instructed our Embassy to meet with other donors and UN special representative Abdallah to urge a coordinated demarche on Burundi extremists warning that development aid would be denied any government that comes to power through force.
- o The upcoming informal refugee talks on the margins of this week's Addis OAU/UNHCR conference could lead to additional summit meetings, and we would push for Bujumbura as a site.
- o Whether to use Bujumbura airport for U.S. military relief flights requires a policy decision. DoD agrees that the airport could be useful in addressing relief needs but does not believe that this is part of their mission.

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